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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C. G. I-IORMAN CO., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VIRGIL J. LLOYD, _MARY C.
LLOYD, his wife, and RAMADA
IN:-:'1" OF PROVO, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12519

Reply Brief of Appellant
This brief is filed in response to the brief of respondents.
Appellant sees no reason to further elaborate on
the Statement of Facts heretofore recited by appellant
and respondents, except that appellant takes issue with
the following statement on page 11 of respondent's
brief:
" ... and especially important is the failure of
appellant to designate the Decree and Judgment of Foreclosure in Civil No. 31,379, which

is vital to the issue of res judicata.
"For the foregoing reasons respondent sets
forth, in toto, the entire Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in Civil No. 31,379, which
was not designated as part of the record: ... "
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant takes issue with the above statement for the
reason that the Judgment in Civil No. 31,379 was designated by appellant as part of the record. It appears
that the Clerk of the Court failed to include the J udgment in the record which was certified to the Supreme
Court. However, it was included in the Designation of
the Contents of the Record, under Item 9-C, as follows:
"9. Certified copies of the following documents from Civil No. 31,379, entitled 'Gerald
Horman Construction Co. vs. Virgil J. Lloyd,
et al, defendants and third-party plaintifs, vs.
C. G. Horman Co., third-party defendant.'

*****

"C. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment dated July 18, 1969." (R.
102) (Emphasis added.)
It appears that the content of the Judgment, as
quoted in respondent's brief, is correct, and appellant
is in full accord with its submission to the Supreme
Court in the event the Clerk of the District Court failed
to include the Judgment in the record transmitted to
the Supreme Court. Appellant has requested the Clerk
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of t: tah County to supplement the record.

OF POINTS
POINT I. APPELLANT IS NOT IN
'TIOLATION OF THE
HET,VEEN THE PARTIES, WAIVING THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL.
POINT II. THE
OF
THE THIRD-PARTY COl\ilPLAINT
OF RESPONDENTS, IN CIVIL NO.
31,379 "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
TIIE RIGIIT TO STATE A DEFENSE
OR RIGHT OF SETOF" IN CIVIL NO.
31,752 PRECLUDES THE RELITIGATION OF THE SAME ISSUES AS A
IN THE PRESENT
ACTION.
POINT Ill. THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT IS NOT IN
VIOLATION OF THE
RET,VEEN TI-IE PARTIES, WAIVTHEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL.
On or about July 21, 1971 the respondents filed
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m the Supreme Court a motion to dismiss this appeal
"for the grounds and reasons the parties to this action
contracted, stipalated and agreed to abide by the decision of the Fourth District Court, and to take no appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court." This motion was
previously heard hy the Supreme Court and was denied.
Nevertheless, respondents have raised this point again
in their brief on appeal. On page 35 of respondent's
brief, many cases are cited to support the proposition
" ... that an agreement not to appeal from a final judgment is valid, binding, and enforceable if the intention
to vn1iYe the right clearly appears from the terms of
the agreement, and is supported by valid consideration."
However, such agreements are not universally enforced.
See Ball vs. FVright, 115 Ga. 729, 42 S.E. 32; Fahs
vs. Darling, 82 Ill. 142; Runnion v. Ramsay, 93 N .C.
410; Sanders v. JVhite, 22 Ga. 103 (a certiorari case).
Furthermore there is judicial precedent to the effect
that an agreement not to appeal does not waive the right
to ch:1llenge the jurisdiction of the lower court, even
hy appeal.
In the case of In Re Ames-Farmer Canning Co.,
190 Iowa 1259, 179 N.,V. 105 (1920) a controversy
between the parties was submitted to arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration agreement in which all parties
specifically waived their right to appeal. The arbitrators rendered their decision and filed it with the Court,
which entered judgment thereon. The losing parties
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filed an appeal, attacking the jurisdiction of the court
to enter judgment because of defects which they allegerl
existed in the form of the agreement. The Court in that
case held as follows:
"But it is insisted by counsel for the canning
company that in any event the remaining parties are bound by the stipulation in the written
agreement, waiving the right of appeal to the
Supreme Court, and that they will not be
heard to question the jurisdiction of the Court.
Agreements not to appeal have been sustained
by this and other courts. [Citing cases, including some of those cases cited by respondents.]
"The award, if binding, is a common law
award. \Vhether it is binding, we do not decide,
but neither party, directly or indirectly, waived
the right to question the jurisdiction of the
Court to enter judgment. A judgment entered
tcithout jurisdiction is void and objections
thereto may be raised for the first time in this
court, or by the court if deemed necessary.
[Citing cases.] The motion filed by counsel
for the canning company to dismiss the appeal,
in so far as the same goes to the question of
jurisdiction, is overruled. Waiving the right to

appeal could not operate as an estoppel against
the parties to prevent them f ram challenging
lhe jurisdiction of the court to cause judgment

to be entered upon the award. nor was it effectual to authorize the entry of a judgment by
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l'Onsent." (179 N.W. at 108) (Emphasis added.)
Consequent it would appear that there is an exception
to the rule cited by respondents and that an agreement
not to appeal from a decision of a lower court does not
bar an attack on the jurisdiction of the lower court by
way of appeal. This exception is clearly recognized in 4
C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 210, p. 613. Respondents
cited this section in their brief but omitted the fallowing
portion:
"Such an agreement or stipulation [before
trial] does not prevent an appeal from the
judgment on the ground of jurisdiction; ... "
Only one case cited by respondents related to an
attack on the jurisdiction of the lower court. In the case
of (TVyrzkowski vs. Budds, 325 Mich. 199, 38 N.W.
2d 313) cited by respondents, the issue of jurisdiction
of the lower court was raised on appeal. The Supreme
Court of Michigan disposed of that issue as follows:
"Her counsel claims- ( 1) that insasmuch as
the first garnishment proceeding was void because of jurisdictional defects; ... the court
erred in dismissing the writ.
"We find no merit in either claim. The question in the first case as to the jurisdictional
defect 'lt'as waived and was not decided .... On
this record the court's findings in the first case
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is res adjudicata of plaintiff's rights against
the bank, and the issuance of the instant writ
was a gross abuse of process." (38 N.vV. 2d
at 314) (Emphasis added.)
In that case, therefore, it would appear that the issue
of jurisdiction was raised and the court found that the
lower court did have jurisdiction.
At the bottom of page 3 of respondent's brief is
the following statement:
"The party insisting upon the waiver in the
case at bar is stronger on two counts: ( 1 ) the
district court had jurisdiction and tried the
case and no bar to its jurisdiction was or is
now urge d ; .... "
The foregoing statement is incorrect, both factually and
because of the legal effect of the appellant's reliance
on the doctrine of res judicata. At the time the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal, it also filed, in the alternative, a :Motion for Writ of Certiorari, as follows:
"In the alternative, plaintiff prays that this
Court enter a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to
Rule 65 B ( b) ( 2) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ... upon the ground that the District
Court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion, as more particularly set forth in the
affidavit of John G. :Marshall, attached hereto." (R. 98) (Emphasis added.)

The purpose of the affidavit was to set forth facts
showing that all issues raised by the counterclaim of respondents in the second case were included in the J udgment of the Court in the first case, dismissing respondents' third-party complaint; and that the issues raised
in the counterclaim had thereupon become res judicata,
by reason of which the Court, in the second case, had
no jurisdiction over the issue. (R. 99-101)
From a legal standpoint, a decision in a case merges
the cause of action into the judgment so that there no
longer remains any cause of action (except one based
upon the judgment), and there is no res (except the
judgment) upon which any subsequent court can base
its jurisdiction to retry the issues. (See, 46 Am. J ur. 2<l,
Judgments, Section 383, page 552.) Consequently.
when appellant raised the defense of res judicata in the
second case it was actually contesting the jurisdiction of
the court to retry those issues.

It should be clear, from the decision of the court
in the second case, that the appellant did in fact raise
the issue of res judicata before the lower court; other\rise there vwuld be no point to including in Finding of
Fact No. 13 an express finding that the first case was
not res judicata on the issues.
Respondents have spent a great deal of space in
their brief in an attempt to confuse the actual holding
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the first case. The purpose of including in the record
on appeal the Third-Party Complaint, Findings of
Fact, Condusions of lAnY, and Judgment in the first
case. was to demonstrate that the issues raised in respmdcnts' Third-Party Complaint in the first case
v\ ere identical in all respects with the respondents' Counterelaim in the second case. This may be demonstrated
by merely examining these documents, because the
counterclaim of the respondents in the second case is
s .1bstantially a Yerbatim copy of their third-party
<'ornplaint in the first case. The rule of law is clear,
that:
111

1

" . . the general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which are at
issue and adjudicated in a former action is
commonly held to be applicable to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter
of the litigation. This application of the general rule extends to questions necessarily involYecl in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated,
or necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific findings may have been
made in reference thereto, and although such
matters \vere not directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could
not haYe been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions
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between the parties, and if the judgment
neccessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself."
46 Am. Jur.2d, Judgments, Section 422, pages
591-593.
Respondents seek to avoid the force of this rule by the
following assertions :
That in dismissing respondents' third-party
complaint (in the first action) Judge Harding did not
necessarily determine that the parties compromised and
settled their disputes (which form the basis of respondents' counterclaim in the second cause of action) by the
execution of the agreement dated February 23, 1967.
On page 20 of respondents' brief it was called "a contingent settlement"; on page 21 of respondents' brief
it was termed "a temporary compromise"; on page 22 is
a statement that Judge Harding "expressly refused to
determine the rights of the parties [under the various
agreements] and deferred that controversy to the instant case."
1.

This matter is best settled by referring to Judge
Harding's decision (in the first case), wherein he stated
(in Findings of Fact, paragraph 7) (R. 120):
"That pursuant to the agreement of December
31, 1065, a first mortgage secured by a Promissory Note in the amount of $615,000.00 was
executed by C. G. Horman Co. and Virgil J.
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Lloyd and :Mary C. Lloyd, his wife; that thereaf tcr a dispute de1.:eloped between C. G. Hor11ian Co. on the one hand and Virgil J. Lloyd
and ftf ar,y C. Lloyd, his wife, on the other
hand, as to the obligation, if any, which C. G.
IIorman Co. had to execute a Second Mortgage commitment in the arnount of $60,000.00;
that in fact no such Second
commitment had ever been obtained, and the parties
compromised and settled that dispute by the
execution of an agreement dated February 23,
H)67, a copy of which was introduced into evidence as EXHIBIT P-7." (Emphasis adderl.)

These are the same two agreements on v1hich Judge
Nelson (in the second case) based his award pursuant
to the counterclaim of the respondent, in which he found
as follows (Findings of Fact, paragraphy 10) (R. 80):
"The Defendants are entitled to damages for
the new mortgage commitment fee and the Attorney's fees which the Defendants have incurred in enforcing their agreement of February 23, 1967 and December 31, 1965, ...
because of Plaintiff's failure to live up to his
financial commitments made in the agreement
of December 31, 1967. (Sic)." (Emphasis
added.)
The Agreement of February 23, 1967, referred to
in those findings, was prepared by Leon Frazier, acting
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as attorney for the Respondents. It refers to their prior
agreement with Appellant dated December 31, 1965
and subsequent modifications, and then states:
"AND VvlIEREAS, Lloyd-Ramada and
Hormans desire to terminate and cancel said
agreement [referring to the agreement of December 31, 1965] and their respective benefits
and liabilities thereunder, and desire to compromise a full and complete settlement and a release of all claims, demands, causes of action,
and any agreements, written or oral, existing
betu.:een themselves and their companies, and to
lorever resolve all the claims and demands of
themselves individually or through their above
n
(R. 15) (Emphasis
named companies.
added.)
Contrary to the assertions of respondents, there is
nothing in the langauge of the agreement of February
23, 1967 to indicate that it was a contingent settlement
or a temporary compromise. It \Vas by its terms an unequiYocal compromise and release, embracing all claims
against each other which existed between the parties as
of that date, and according to its terms it terminated
and cancelled the agreement of December 31, 1965.
Secondly, respondents contend that Judge
Harding dismissed respondents' third-party complaint
without prejudice. This point will be further treated in
POINT II and need not be elaborated here.
2.
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Thirdly, respondents contend that Judge
Harding's decision dismissing their third-party complaint upon the ground of compromise was not material to the judgment entered by Judge Harding. Nevertheless, in paragraph four of the Judgement, Judge
Harding did in fact dismiss the third-party complaint
insofar as it sought affirmative relief against the C. G.
Horman Co. (See Respondents Brief p. 15 or Supplement to the Record). His decision that the parties
had compromised all claims and disputes between themselves "\Yas certainly material to the judgment of dismissal.
respect to the issue of materially, respondents also assert that it is impossible to determine what
bearing this dismissal had on the outcome of the case,
since: "Nothing in the record indicates that the defendant's third-party complaint had any bearing upon the
plaintiff's lien claims in Civil No. 31,379. What Gerald
Horman' s claims were in this first case is not a matter
of record; the complaint in Civil No. 31,379 is absent
from the record on appeal; appellant did not designate
it to be part of the record." (Respondents' brief, page
22) To this, appellants responds as follows:
3.

The doctrine of res judicata in the second matter
"·as raised not because of the decision rendered by Judge
Harding with respect to the plaintiff's complaint in that
matter, but rather because of the decision of Judge
Harding with respect to respondents' third-party complaint, which was a separate cause of action wherein the
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'respondents sought affirmative relief and by their own
act brought a new party in to the lawsuit. Furthermore,
if respondents feel that there is something essential to
this appeal in the complaint of Gerald Horman against
respondents in the first action, respondents were free
to designate it as part of the record.
Respondents further allege, on pages 25 and 26 of
their brief, th.'.1t the doctrine of res judicata cannot lie
as a bar, since "the judgment is not presently in the
record." Appellant again asserts that the Judgment
should be present in the record because the appellant
included the Judgment within its designation of record,
so that that should not be an objection.
On page 26, respondents cite the case of Oklahoma
City vs. b'lcMasters, 196 U.S. 533, 25. Sup. Ct. 325, 49
L.Ed. 587 (1905), apparently for the purpose of stating that if no judgment is included
in a record on appeal the Supreme Court should affirm
the decision of the court below. However, in reading
that case, it becomes apparent that no judgment was
entered by the trial court in the action which appellant
was relying on to prove the claim of res judicata, although this part of the quotation was omitted from respondents' brief.
For all the foregoing reasons, it would appear that
it is conclusively established by examining the record
that the decision of Judge Harding, dismissing respond-
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ents' third-party complaint, necessarily involved all of
the issues raised by respondents' counterclaim in the
second action; hence, that Judge Harding's decision was
res judicata as to the issues raised on the counterclaim
in the second trial; that the cause of action attempted
to be asserted in respondents' counterclaim in the ·second action was merged into Judge Harding's
judgment of dismissal in the first action; and that the
Court, in the second case, had no cause of action before
it and no res upon which to attach its jurisdiction. Appellant also submits that it has never waived its
right to question the jurisdiction of the court, and that
this appeal does not violate any agreement of the parties.

POINT II. THE D I S 1\1 I S SAL OF
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
OF RESPONDENTS IN CIVIL NO.
31,379 "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
THE RIGHT TO STATE A DEFENSE
OR RIGHT OF SETOFF" IN CIVIL
NO. 31,752 PRECLUDES THE RELITIGATION OF THE SAME ISSUES AS
A COUNTERCLAIM IN THE PRESENT ACTION.
Respondents made a big point of stating that
J ndge Harding dismissed the third-party complaint
without prejudice, in an attempt to explain away the
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fact that Judge Harding, both in his Findings of Fad
and in the Judgment entered in the first case, limited
his statement that the dismissal of the third-party complaint was without prejudice "to the right [ ... of respondents] to state a defense of right of setoff against
C. G. Horman Co. in Civil No. 31,752, pending in the
above-entitled court."
By referring to Judge Harding's decision, and parto the contract of February 23, 1967 (upon
which Judge Harding based his decision that the parties had compromised and settled all disputes existing
between themselves) it may be seen that the parties, in
their agreement, and Judge Harding in his decision, intended to state that the parties settled their disputes
to the extent that they would not seek damages against
each other based on any breach of contract which they
may have claimed existed prior to the agreement of
February 23, 1967. Hmvever, in the agreement of February 23, 1967 the parties also agreed that respondents
would buy out the interest of appellant in the project,
though they were not able to agree on the purchase
price.
In paragraph 11 of the agreement of December
31, 1965 (R. 9) appellant had given to respondents an
option to purchase its interest in the motel project, the
price of which was to be determined by a formula contained therein. Even though the parties stated in the
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agreement of February 23, 1967 that they intended to
cancel the agreement of December 31, 1965, it is obvious
from the context of the later agreement that the respondents intended to exercise their option to purchase
in accordance with their understanding of the formula
set out in the prior agreement and also that appellant
intended to rely on its understanding of that same
formula to determine the purchase price. By the express
terms of the agreement of February 23, 1967 (R. 16),
the only dispute remaining between the parties was the
determination of the amount due appellant for the purchase price of its interest in the project. All other
disputes, including any claims one might have against
the other for damages, were compromised and settled
by that agreement.
The agreement of Feb1uary 23, 1967 set up the
manner in which the dispute as to the pnrchase price
was to be determined; that is, by resort to the court to be
initiated at the option of appellant, which was why the
second case was filed. A reading of the complaint in
the second case (R. 3) will indicate that no claim for
damages was asserted against respondents. The intention of the parties to limit the issues of the second case
to a determination of the balance of the purchase price
due appellant is clearly manifest in the agreements
which were subsequently entered into on March 23, 1967
( R. 20) and on April 24, 1967 (R. 24). In the latter
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agreement, the parties clearly expressed such intention
but added one refinement, (paragraph 3) as follows:
"Lloyds-Ramada (respondents herein) herewith waive any and all claim or defense which
they might otherwise assert to the payment to
C. G. Horman Company of the first sum of
Fifty-Five Thousand ($55,500.00) Five Hundred Dollars referred to in paragraph ( 1) of
the Agreement of February 23, 1967, heretofore entered into between [appellant and respondents], which Agreement is hereinafter
referred to as 'the said Agreement of February 23, 1967.' The parties agree that the said
$55,500.00 shall be paid to C. G. Horman
Company upon the execution of this agreement, and that none of the other parties hereto
will assert any claim or make any attempt to
prevent the payment thereof or interfere with
the receipt thereof by C. G. Horman Company. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a waiver of the claim of C. G.
Horman Company that it is actually entitled
to an additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand
( $55,500.00) Five Hundred Dollars ( constituting $111,000.00 total) for the sale of its interest in the land and improvements constituting the said motel complex, nor shall anything
contained herein be construed as a waiver to
any defense or right of setoff which could be
asserted by LLOYDS-RAMADA in the
event-of suit by C. G. Horman Company with
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respect to the said claim." (R. 24, 25) (Emphasis added.)

It is clear, by the words quoted above, that the
parties did not intend to revive old differences and
claims between themselves (whether real or imaginary)
based on the breaches or defaults they had previously
claimed against each other, but rather that they were
still seeking to work out a means of resolving their
different views as to the purchase price of appellant's
interest in the project. This is the significance of the
recognition that C. G. Horman claimed it was entitled
to additional sums for the purchase of its interest. By
the use of the words italicized in the above quotation,
it is obvious that the respondents intended only to preserve their right to defeat or diminish any amount which
appellant might recover as an additional purchase price.
There is not one word in any of the contracts, beginning with the agreement of February 23, 1967, that
indicates that the parties intended to reserve any claim
against each other for damages. All of that was settled
by the agreement of February 23, 1967.
Respondents seek to avoid this conclusion by their
reasoning (on page 28 of respondents' brief) that the
words "defense or right of setoff" were broad enough
to include the term "counterclaim." Yet it should be
obvious that the term "counterclaim" is not synony-
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mous with the terms "defense" and "set off", in spite
of the fact that a counterclaim may be asserted either
as a defense or a setoff. A setoff is distinguishable
from a counterclaim in that a "setoff" cannot be the
subject of affirmative relief. See National Bank of
Suffolk vs. T¥inslow, 193 N.C. 470, 137 S.E. 320. See
also the case of JJl arconi Wireless Telegraph Company
of America vs. National Electric Signalling Company,
206 Fed. 295 (at 299) (D.C.N.Y.) wherein the court
said:
"A 'setoff' is generally considered to be a matter which will be capable of use as an offset to
any recovery by the plaintiff. A 'counterclaim'
is a matter which is capable of use as a basis
for a judgment for relief against the plaintiff,
and, of course, may be used as a setoff as well."

In Rogue-River 1llanagement Company vs. Shaw, 243
Ore. 54, 411 P.2d 440 (at 443) the court stated:
" 'Counterclaim' differs in scope from 'setoff'
and 'recoupment'. Only a counterclaim permits
affirmative relief .... Recoupment and setoff
may be available as defenses for the purpose of
liquidating the whole or part of plaintiff's
claim in situations where an independent action
would not lie."
In Lovett vs. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (at
780) the court stated:
"There is a plain distinction between a defense
and a counterclaim. A counterclaim must be a
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cause of action. and seeks affirmative relief,
lYhile a defense merely (lefeats the plaintiff's
cause of action by a denial, or confession and
avoidance, and does not admit of affirmative
relief to the defendant." (Emphasis added.)
In view of the foregoing, it is obvious that the
judgment rendered by Judge Harding in the first case
effectively decided adversely to the respondents (and
therefore terminated) the claims respondents asserted
in the second case against appellant for breach of contract and all other alleged defaults occurring prior to
the compromise agreement entered into on February 23,
1967. Furthermore, the effect of Judge Harding's decision in the first case necessarily limited the issues in
the second case to those claims which arose oiit of the
agreement of February 23, 1967 or thereafter, namely:
( 1) whether appellant was entitled to any additional
sum for the purchase of its interest in the motel project, and ( 2) whether respondents were entitled to diminish or defeat appellant's recovery by stating a valid
def cnse or offset thereto. This necessarily precluded
the decision rendered by Judge Nelson in the second
case to the effect that the respondents were entitled to
damages for the ne-,,v mortgage commitment fee and attorney's fees which respondents had incurred in enforcing their agreements of February 23, 1967 and December 31, 1965 because of the plaintiff's failure to
live up to its financial commitment made in the agree-

22

ment of December 31, 1965. Findings of Fact, paragraph 10 (R. 80).
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES.
On page 38 of respondents' brief, respondents
assert that the award of attorney's fees was for attorney's fees "incurred in enforcing the December 31,
1965 and February 23, 1967 contracts."
Appellant respectfully contends that the trial court
was not legally correct in awarding attorney's fees
even on the basis asserted by respondents, for two
reasons: ( 1) By the agreement of February 23, 1967
the parties waived any claim for damages arising out
of any claimed breach of the contract of December 31,
1965. This is implicit in Judge Harding's decision in
the first case, as set forth in POINT II above. And
(2) neither the contract of December 31, 1965 nor the
contract of February 23, 1967 contains any provision
to the effect that either party agrees to pay the attorney's fees of the other party. In fact, the agreement
of February 23, 1967 negates that idea in the following
language: "Lloyd-Ramada [respondents] agree to retain and pay Leon M:. Frazier to handle said suit. If
Hormans [appellant] desire to retain a separate attorney they agree to pay their own attorney's fees." (R.
16) (Emphasis added.)
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court was not justified in a 'rnrding attorney's fees to either party.

CONCLUSION
respectfully submits that this Court
should reverse the judgment of the lower court and
dismiss the counterclaim of defendants-respondents and
award appellant its costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. MARSHALL

